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So it would seem that the legislature's use of the word "practice" could well be con-
strued to include service of process. However, the constitutional issue of due process
still remains. Historically, service of process was not a right of the defendant's but a
command to appear in the king's court.r3 It has gradually acquired a different sig-
nificance, however, with the growth, in Anglo-American countries, of the due process
concept.4 This is understood to mean, in this connection, that a defendant must have
the opportunity to be heard before judgment can be rendered.'s A corollary to this
principle is that he must know that a suit is pending against him.x6 Mere knowledge
on his part that such a suit has been brought is not sufficient. 17 The most that is re-
quired, however, is reasonable notice, such notice as would advise the average man
that he should appear in court and defend his rights. 8 The due process requirement
does not demand that traditional methods be used.19 Therefore, so long as a pre-
scribed method of service conforms to the requirement that reasonable notice be
given, no constitutional objection is apparent.
Hence, there would seem to be no reason why a majority of the judges of the
Municipal Court could not promulgate rules for service of summons. It is unfortunate
that the court, in properly invalidating Rule ioA, has precluded such action.
Practice-Substituted Service on Non-resident Motorist-Liability of Foreign
Corporations-[Illinois].-An agent of the defendant, a non-resident corporation,
injured the plaintiffs while driving a car "on behalf of" the defendant. In an action
for damages service of process was made on the defendant in accordance with the pro-
visions of an Illinois statute: "The use and operation by a non-resident of a motor
vehicle over the highways of the State of Illinois, shall be deemed an appointment
.... of the Secretary of State to be his .... attorney upon whom may be served all
legal process in any action .... ,growing out of such use ... .", The defendant chal-
lenged the application of the statute to a non-resident corporation when the car is
driven by an employee. On appeal from a judgment for the defendant, held, affirmed.
'3 Prewitt v. Caudill, 250 Ky. 698, 7o4, 63 S.W. (2d) 954, 957 (i933); Shipman, Common
Law Pleading 17 (3d ed. 1923).
14 See Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (i855) and David-
son v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, io (1877) for statements that "by the law of the land" in
Magna Carta have the same connotation as our phrase "due process of law." See also Straub
v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183 (1878); Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. 231, 239 (1867); Galpin v. Page,
85 U.S. 350, 368 (x873); Riverside Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. I89 (1914).
'S Pinney v. Providence Loan Co., xo6 Wis. 396, 82 N.W. 308 (igoo); Furgeson v. Jones, I7
Ore. 204, 20 Pac. 842 (x888).
16 Strode v. Strode, 6 Idaho 67, 52 Pac. i6i (z898); Nat'l Metal Co. v. Greene Consol.
Copper Co., 9 Ariz. 192, 8o Pac. 397 (xo5).
'7 Scott v. McNeal, x54 U.S. 34 (1894); Hobby v. Bunch, 83 Ga. 1, io S.E. 113 (i889);
Davies v. Thompson, 6i Okla. 21, i6o Pac. 75 (1916).
'8 Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (igoo); City of Norfolk v. Young, 97 Va. 728, 34 S.E. 886
(igq0); Commonwealth v. O'Keafe, 298 Pa. 16, 148 Ad. 73 (1929).
'9 Hurtado v. California, iio U.S. 516 (1884) (information instead of indictment does not
violate due process); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (igoo) (jury of less than twelve).
xIll. L. 1929, p. 646; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 954 § 23.
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Liability under the statute is "confined to personal operation of a motor vehicle by a
non-resident owner." Jones et al. v. Pebler et al.2
Statutes permitting substituted service on a "fictitious agent" in actions against
non-resident motorists have been passed in many states.3 They have been held con-
stitutional as a rightful exercise of the police power.4
Because substituted service is said to be "in derogation of the common law" the
courts of many states construe their statutes strictly.s Of the three states where
statutes similar to that of Illinois have been construed, 6. two-New York7 and Michi-
gang-limited the application of the statute to those non-residents who personally
drove their automobiles. A legislative amendment was necessary in b6th states to ex-
tend the acts to non-residents operating through agents.9 The court in the instant
case accepted as binding the strict construction of the New York and Michigan courts.
The statutes of these states, however, had not been construed by the courts at the
time the Illinois statute was enacted.o Although it is presumed that the legislature
intends a statute adopted from another state to receive the construction given it by
2 296 Ill. App. 460, 16 N.E. (2d) 438 (1938).
3 Culp, Process in Actions against Non-resident Motorists, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1934)
(lists thirty-five states). See also 20 Iowa L. Rev. 654, 66o-2 (1935) (collection of thirty-three
statutes).
4 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, i8 (1928);
Rest., Conflicts of Laws § 84 (934).
5 O'Tier v. Sell, 252 N.Y. 400, 169 N.E. 624 (1930); Day v. Bush, 18 La. App. 682, 139
So. 42 (1932); Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 365 (D.C. Tex. 1932); Brown v. Cleveland Trac-
tor Co., 265 Mich. 475, 251 N.W. 557 (1933); Flynn v. Kramer, 271 Mich. 500, 261 N.W. 77
(i935); Kirchner v. N. and W. Overall Co., 16 F. Supp. 915 (S.C. igj6); Wood v. White et al.,
97 F. (2d) 646 (App. D.C. 1938). Contra: Poti v. New England Road Machinery Co., 83
N.H. 232, 14o Atl. 587 (1928); Salzman v. Attrean, 142 Misc. 245, 254 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1931).
6 The following six states have or had statutes similar to Illinois: New York (now
amended), Michigan (now amended), Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington. To
date only the first three have been construed. For suggestion of Oregon interpretation see
Nelson v. Smith, 69 P. (2d) 1072, 1073, 1077 (Ore. 1937).
7O'Tier v. Sell, 252 N.Y. 400, 169 N.E. 624 (193o), reversing 226 App. Div. 434, 235 N.Y.
Supp. 534 (1929). Cf. Sexauer Mvfg. Co. v. Grimm, 217 Wis. 422, 259 N.W. 262 (935) (im-
plies a liberal construction).
8 Brown v. Cleveland Tractor Co., 265 Mich. 475, 251, N.W. 557 (1933) followed in Flynn
v. Kramer, 271 Mich. 500, 261 N.W. 77 (i935).
9 The present New York statute was derived from § 285a of the Highway Law. The former
§ 285a, as added by N.Y.L. 1928, c. 465, and amended by N.Y.L. 1929, c. 1o (to include
a non-resident whose car was being operated "with his consent, express or implied"), was re-
pealed by N.Y.L. 1929, C. 54, which repealed the amendment before it took effect and re-
enacted N.Y.L. 1928, C. 465. Reenactment amended by N.Y.L. 1930, c. 57 (to include
operation "with consent, express or implied").
Michigan statute enacted by Mich. Acts 1929, No. 8o, amended by Mich. Acts 1935, No.
11O.
lo Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, C. 951, § 23, enacted by Ill. L. 1929, p. 646 (approved June 25,
1929). First New York case decided June 27, 1929-O'Tier v. Sell, 226 App. Div. 434, 235 N.Y.
Supp. 534 (1929).
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the courts of that state prior to its adoption," the interpretations of the foreign state
court made after adoption usually are not binding. 2
The approach of the Illinois court, adopted from the leading case of O'Tier v. Sell,3
was to emphasize "operate," interpreting it to mean personal manipulation. Then the
court limited "non-resident" to that meaning consistent with "operate." The effect
is to exclude from the scope of the statute such non-residents as corporations, partner-
ships, or individuals operating through agents. These "non-residents," however,
could have been included had "operate" been construed to mean "to direct the work-
ing of."4 A lower New York court reached this conclusion after the O'Tier decision
when it held a foreign corporation to be included in "non-resident."is In addition, the
manner in which the Illinois legislature modified the wording of the New York act'6 is
some indication that it intended to include corporations. Instead of "operation by a
non-resident" the Illinois statute 7 reads "use and operation"; instead of "in any action
.... growing out of any accident .... in which such non-resident may be involved,
while operating .... ," the Illinois act reads "in any action .... growing out of such
use or resulting in damage or loss. ... , and said use or operation .......
In narrowing the possible scope of the statute, the court has apparently disregarded
the reasons for the legislation, the problems to be solved, and the objects to be attained.
Prior to the enactment of the statute a non-resident who avoided the jurisdiction ran
slight risk of being sued. The prohibitive expense of transporting witnesses, parties,
and evidence to the new jurisdiction often gave the reckless non-resident a practical
immunity. The statute has attempted to solve this problem by extending liability to
the non-resident where it would normally attach were he a resident, by requiring him
to answer an action for damages in a court near the scene of the accident. If these
considerations support jurisdiction over non-resident individuals, they seem no less
relevant when the defendant is a non-resident corporation or individual operating
through agents, 8 who are often financially irresponsible. The large proportion of cars
owned and operated by foreign corporations and partnerships was as obvious to the
legislature as was the fact that a corporation can perform such physical acts as operat-
ing a car only through agents. To nullify the force of the statute as to this group of
non-residents is to sacrifice the probable intent of the legislature to the concept-
"in derogation of the common law."
"1 Rhoads v. Chicago and Aurora Railway Co., 227 Ill. 328, 334, 81 N.E. 371, 373 (1907);
People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532, 540, 92 N.E. 313, 3x6 (igio); Suburban Ice Co. v. Industrial
Board, 274 Ill. 63o, 633, 113 N.E. 979, 981 (19x6); People v. Northern Trust Co., 289 II.
475,482, 124 N.E. 662, 665 (xgg); People v. Linn, 357 IU. 220, 226, igi N.E. 450,453 (1934);
Kerner v. Thompson, 365 Ill. 149, 155, 6 N.E. (2d) 131, 134 (1936).
" Rhoads v. Chicago and Aurora Railway Co., 227 Ill. 328, 334, 81 N.E. 371, 373 (1907);
People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532, 540, 92 N.E. 313, 316 (191o); Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571,
588, 162 N.E. 170, I77 (1928).
3 252 N.Y. 400, z69 N.E. 624 (1930).
'4 7 Oxford English Dictionary 144 (1933).
is Bischoff v. Schnepp, 139 Misc. 293, 249 N.Y. Supp. 49, 50 (1930).
'
6McKinney's Consol. L.N.Y. X929, Book 62-A, § 52. For present New York law see
McKinney's Consol. L.N.Y. 1929, Book 62-A, § 52 (Supp. 1937).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, c. 95 , § 23.
'8 Culp, op. cit. supra note 3, at 346.
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Although the word "owner" appears nowhere in the Illinois statute, the court says
liability is "confined to personal operation by a non-resident owmer."19 Cited in sup-
port of this position is a case o decided under the New York act, but after an amend-
ment which specifically stated the requirement of ownership. It is unlikely that the
court foresaw the ultimate significance of this requirement. Suppose a non-resident
individual injures an Illinois citizen while personally operating a car owned by a third
party. If service is made under the statute with the ownership requirement, the court
must deny validity merely because the non-resident operator did not own the car.
Such a result could not have been contemplated by the court. The "potential harm"
is as great whether the operator or another holds title.21
Taxation-Constitutionality of Use Tax-Burden on Interstate Commerce-
[Washington].-The plaintiff sought to enjoin the state tax commissioners from col-
lecting a use or compensating tax which a Washington statute' imposed upon the
privilege of using within its boundaries any article of tangible personal property not
already subject to local or out-of-state sales tax. The plaintiff's equipment, which
could only be purchased outside of the State of Washington, was stored within the
state until used in the operation, maintenance and repair of the plaintiff's intermingled
intrastate and interstate telephone and telegraph system. Held, for the plaintiff.
Exaction of the tax is an unlawful burden upon interstate commerce. Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph Co. v. Henneford et al., Tax Commissioners.'
As a result of the depression many states turned to the sales tax as a source of much
needed revenue.3 The inapplicability of these taxes to interstate sales because of the
interstate commerce clause, led to many out-of-state purchases and consequently to
loss of business by local merchants and revenue by the states. 4 In an effort to prevent
this avoidance of the sales tax, a number of states have recently turned to the use tax,
as was the situation in the instant case.s
The adoption of the use tax has not solved the problems arising from state taxation
of interstate commerce. Although it has widened the field of state taxation in foreign-
purchase home-consumption cases, the problem of determining when goods are a part
of interstate commerce, and as such subject to state taxation, still remains. Immunity
from state taxation depends on the supreme courts' ever-varying determination of the
requisite degree of closeness to a prior or subsequent transportation into or out of the
'9 Jones et al. v. Pebler el al., 296 Ill. App. 460, 16 N.E. (2d) 438 (1938).
"0 Wallace v. Smith, 238 App. Div. 599, 265 N.Y. Supp. 253 (1933).
2" Culp, op. cit. supra note 3, at 345.
' Wash. L. 1935, c. i8o, § 4, 726-728; amended in Wash. L. 1937, c. 191, 943-946.
281 P. (2d) 786 (Wash. 1938).
3 Twenty states now have general sales taxes: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
4 Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce, 12 N. C. L. Rev. 99,
ioo (1933); Ahern, State Sales and Use Taxes, 25 Geo. L. J. 714 (1937).
s Eleven states-California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Utah, Washington and Wyoming-now have separate use taxes, while Arkansas and
Louisiana include a use tax provision in their sales tax.
